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THE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
OFFENSE DOCTRINE AS A RULE OF EVIDENCE
Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975)
Defendant was indicted and tried for bank robbery in violation of
the Federal Bank Robbery Act.1 The district court set aside the result-
ing conviction of knowing possession of the proceeds of a bank robbery2
* As this issue went to press, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment in Phillips and remanded the case for further consideration in light of United
States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976). United States v. Phillips, 424 U.S. 961
(1976). See note 48 and text accompanying notes 57-61 infra. On remand the Fourth
Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction. Phillips v. United States, 538 F.2d 586 (1976).
1. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970). 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970) provides:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to
take, from the person or presence of another any property or money or any
other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management,
or possession of, any [federally insured] bank. . . or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank ... with intent to commit
in such bank. . . any felony affecting such bank. . . and in violation of any
statute of the United States, or any larceny-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970) provides:
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy
the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years,
or both.
2. Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d 227, 228-29 (4th Cir. 1974). Defendant as-
serted an alibi defense. After retiring to consider its verdict, the jury asked for a supple-
mentary instruction on the necessity of defendant's presence in the bank. The court re-
plied that the jury must find that the defendant was present in the bank during the rob-
bery in order to convict for robbery; such presence was unnecessary to convict on the
"lesser included offense" of knowing possession of the proceeds of a bank robbery. Ten
minutes after receiving this instruction, the jury returned its verdict finding the defend-
ant guilty of possession of money stolen from a bank. Id. at 229.
It is unclear from the record why the defendant could not have been convicted as a
principal even though not present in the bank during the robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1970) provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
as a principal.
Judge Craven raised this argument in his dissent to the panel decision. Phillips v.
United States, 502 F.2d 227, 234 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974) (Craven, J., dissenting).
Courts have repeatedly held that this section allows conviction of a defendant for bank
robbery even if he were not present in the bank during the robbery. See, e.g., United
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on the ground that the indictment did not include this offense. 3
Defendant was subsequently indicted for illegal possession of the
money he had earlier been charged with stealing.4  At the trial on this
States v. Burkeen, 350 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 966 (1966);
United States v. Simmons, 281 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1960); Tarkington v. United States, 194
F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1952). Nor should the Government's failure to charge the defendant
with a violation of this section have prevented his conviction. See Levine v. United
States, 430 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1970) (one who is indicted as a principal may be con-
victed on evidence showing that he merely aided and abetted); United States v. Lugo-
Baez, 412 F2d 435 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 966 (1970); United States v.
Ramsey, 374 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1967); Nassif v. United States, 370 F.2d 147 (8th Cir.
1966): Lambert v. United States, 226 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
988 (1956); United States v. Hodorowicz, 105 F.2d 218 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 584 (1939). This result has been explained as follows:
An indictment need not specifically charge aiding and abetting or causing the
commission of an offense against the United States in order to support a jury
verdict based upon the finding of either. All indictments must be read in ef-
fect as if the alternatives provided by 18 U.S.C. § 2 were embodied in each
count.
United States v. Ehrenberg, 354 F. Supp. 460, 463 (E.D. Pa.), a!f'd, 485 F.2d 682 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974). See also United States v. Bullock, 451
F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1971). Thus, had the evidence warranted, the trial judge in
Phillips could have instructed the jury on an aiding and abetting theory although defend-
ant was indicted only as a principal. See United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d
Cir. 1972); United States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1969); Theriault v. United
States, 401 F.2d 79 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1100 (1969); Pinkney v.
United States, 380 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 908 (1967); United States
v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967); Glass v.
United States, 328 F.2d 754 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 983 (1964); United States
v. Washington, 287 F.2d 819 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 969 (1961).
In both the panel and en bane decisions, the Fourth Circuit assumed that possession
is not a lesser included offense of bank robbery. Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d
227, 229 n.7 (4th Cir. 1974); Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108, 111 (4th Cir.
1975) (en bane), noted in 11 WAKE FoR. L REv. 691 (1975). The Supreme Court
recently confirmed this assumption in United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
For a discussion of lesser included offenses under the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, see Annot., II A.L.R. FED. 173 (1972).
3. Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1974). A footnote to
Judge Craven's dissenting opinion explained:
In Phillips' case the trial judge granted defendant's motion for new trial, giv-
ing as his reason:
lI]n an abundance of caution, it may be that the charge of the lesser
offense, given as it was, after a time of deliberation, could have been un-
duly influencing upon the jury.
App. 3. The trial judge had omitted the instruction on possessing stolen
money from the original charge at the request of defense counsel who, in the
judge's words, "was willing to go whole hog or nothing." Tr. 343, Trial of
April 16, 17, 1973. The jury's question persuaded the judge that withholding
the instruction was error.
Id. at 234-35 n.4. See note 2 supra.
4. Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) (1970), which provides:
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charge, the government introduced evidence over objection tending to
show that the defendant was present in the bank as a participant during
the robbery to prove that he knew the money was stolen. Defendant
was convicted. A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed the second conviction, holding that the first trial had resolved
the question of defendant's presence in the bank against the Govern-
ment;5 collateral estoppel barred the Government from relitigating the
issue.6 On rehearing en banc, a majority of the court could not agree on
the applicable reason, but affirmed the reversal and held: The Govern-
ment could not introduce evidence showing that defendant was present
in the bank and a participant in the robbery at his trial for possessing
the proceeds of that robbery.7 Three judges8 adhered to the panel
opinion's decision that collateral estoppel applied. Three judges
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or disposes of,
any property or money or other thing of value knowing the same to have been
taken from a bank ... in violation of subsection (b) of this section shall be
subject to the punishment provided by said subsection (b) for the taker.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1970) provides:
Whoever takes and carries away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property
or money or any other thing of value exceeding $100 belonging to, or in the
care, custody, control, management, or possession of any bank . . . shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both
5. See note 2 supra.
6. Phillips v. United States, 502 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1974).
7. Phillips v. United States, 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975).
As Judge Widener pointed out in dissent, this ruling left the court in the somewhat
anomalous position of rejecting each rationale for reversing the trial court by a 4-3 mar-
gin, yet sustaining that result by a 6-1 margin. Four members of the court specifically
held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel, see notes 30-34 infra, did not foreclose the
government from offering the proof in question, yet the government could not introduce
that very evidence because a minority of the court believed that the Milanovich rule, see
notes 41-48 infra, rendered it inadmissible. Phillips v. United States, supra at 112.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once expressed his dissatisfaction with this kind of result
as follows: "And so, conflicting minorities in combination bring to pass a result-
paradoxical as it may appear-which differing majorities of the Court find insupport-
able." National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Although Phillips failed to establish guidelines for lower courts in the Fourth Circuit,
the decision itself is not necessarily erroneous. The primary task of any court is to de-
cide the particular case before it. When six of seven judges agree, although for different
reasons, that a criminal conviction should be reversed, the agreement on the result
rather than the disagreement about the applicable reasons for that result must control.
8. Judges Winter, Russell, and Field applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
See text accompanying notes 30-34 infra.
9. Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judges Craven and Butzner applied the Milanovich
rule. See text accompanying notes 40-50 infra.
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reasoned that the evidence was inadmissible under the mutually-
exclusive-offense rule established in Milanovich v. United States.'0
The Federal Bank Robbery Act" prohibits robbery, 2 attempted
robbery,'" larceny," and armed robbery' 5 of federally insured banks,
and the reception, possession, and concealment of the proceeds of such
robberies.t' Congress undoubtedly has the power to outlaw and punish
as separate and distinct offenses the severable ingredients of a single
act.I7  Such statutory division of one act or integrated course of conduct
into more than one crime's creates two distinct, though closely related,
10 365 U.S. 551 (1961). See text accompanying notes 40-50 infra.
In addition, the court instructed the district court that the defendant would be es-
topped from offering evidence at any subsequent trial that he was in the bank during
the robbery and therefore a "thief" rather than a "receiver." Under this court's reading
of Milanovich, such proof would establish the defendant's incapacity to be convicted as
a receiver. See notes 40-50 infra and accompanying text. Once again, a majority of the
court could not agree on the theory supporting this finding. Three judges relied on col-
lateral estoppel and two others on equitable estoppel. Since Phillips took the position
throughout both trials that he was neither in the bank during the robbery nor involved in
it in any way, and nothing in the record indicates that he ever tried to raise such a
defense, this issue was not properly before the court.
II. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970). For a discussion of the history, validity, and con-
struction of the Act, see Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 946 (1958).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970), quoted in note I supra.
13, Id.
14, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) (1970), quoted in note 4 supra.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (1970), quoted in note 1 supra.
16. 18 U.S.C. t 2113(c) (1970), quoted in note 4 supra.
17. See Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (upholding consecutive sen-
tences for a single sale of a drug in violation of three statutes) and cases cited therein;
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S.
1, 11 (1927) ("There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents Congress from pun-
ishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a transaction which it has
power to prohibit and punishing also the completed transaction"); Morgan v. Devine,
237 U.S. 632 (1915) (upholding consecutive sentences for breaking into a post office
with intent to commit larceny, and larceny). The double jeopardy clause limits the
power of courts, not legislatures. See Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262,
302 (1965); Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New
Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 363-68 (1955).
18. Although it is clearly necessary to limit the extent to which one act or inte-
grated course of conduct can be treated as more than one crime and accompanied by
cumulative penalties, solutions have not been forthcoming. As legislatures increase the
number of separate offenses with overlapping application, problems arise more frequent-
ly. See J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 64 (1969); Horack, The Multiple Consequences of
a Single Ciminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REv. 805, 820 (1937); Mayers and Yarbrough, Bis
Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29 (1960); Note,
Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory
Penalties, 67 YALE L.J. 916 (1958); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/5
342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:338
problems for the accused:' multiple vexation through separate trials
on basically the same facts, 20 and multiple punishment for what is
essentially one criminal activity.2'
The fifth amendments prohibition against placing a defendant twice
in jeopardy for the "same offense" 22 offers some protection from both
dangers. The double jeopardy clause prohibits retrial of the accused
for the "same offense" after an acquittal. 23  When the accused has been
convicted, the clause prohibits both imposition of multiple punishment2'
279; Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 341-44; 67 YALE L.I. 916 (1958).
19. See Kirchheimer, The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513,
526-27 (1949); Note, The Protection from Multiple Trials, 11 STAN. L. Rnv. 735
(1959); Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life
for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 340-46; 67 YALE L.J. 916,
918-23 (1958).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) (single sale led to prose-
cution for selling narcotics without required order form, followed by prosecution for sell-
ing narcotics not in or from original package); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338
(1911) (prosecution for insulting a public official following a conviction for disorderly
conduct based on same words and conduct); Cox v. Gaffney, 459 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 863 (1972) (possession of concealed handgun and possession of
hand gun by convicted felon); Black v. Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 45 (W.D. Va. 1968) (rape
and child molestation).
21. See, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (single sale of a
narcotic drug in violation of three statutes); McGann v. United States, 261 F.2d 956
(4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 974 (1959) (bank robbery and robbery on lands
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States based on single robbery); Crapo
v. Johnston, 144 F.2d 863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 785 (1944) (possession of
unregistered firearm and possession of same firearm after a transfer without paying re-
quired transfer tax); United Cigar Whelan Stores Corp. v. United States, 113 F.2d 340
(9th Cir. 1940) (sale of denatured alcohol for beverage purposes and sale of denatured
alcohol in unstamped container); United States v. White, 156 F. Supp. 37 (E.D. Va.
1957) (unlawful possession of distilling apparatus, unlawful carrying on of business of
distiller, unlawful making of mash fit for distillation, and unlawful possession of distilled
spirits).
22. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
. 23. This protection corresponds to the common law plea of autrefois acquit. See
Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 341-42 n.13; Comment, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 262 n.1.
24. Some courts have maintained that the double jeopardy clause only protects
against multiple trials and does not apply to multiple punishments for the "same of-
fense" at one trial. See, e.g., Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941) (dictum)
("the erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single offense of which the accused
has been convicted, or as to which he has pleaded guilty, does not constitute double jeo-
pardy"); Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 902 (10th Cir. 1954) (dictum)
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and a second trial of the accused for the "same offense."25 Fed-
eral courts have traditionally employed the "same evidence" test"e
("[Tlhe Fifth Amendment is not against the imposition of a double sentence for the
same offense, but is against trying one for a second time for the same offense").
These cases, however, have either ignored or misread Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163 (1874). In Lange, petitioner was convicted under a statute authorizing ei-
ther fine or imprisonment. The trial court fined petitioner and ordered him jailed. Pe-
titioner paid the fine and then brought a habeas corpus action, asserting that the double
jeopardy clause protected him from the second punishment. The Supreme Court agreed,
holding that imposition of two punishments at a single trial for a single offense when
the statute authorizes only alternative punishments violates the double jeopardy clause.
In vacating the prison sentence, the Court noted:
For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one
trial if there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same
verdict?
. T]he Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from
being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it.
Id. at 173.
The Supreme Court has also heard collateral attacks by writ of habeas corpus in sev-
eral cases in which multiple punishment was imposed at a single trial, allegedly for the
"same offense." Although the Court found that the offenses were distinct, the decision
to grant review implies that double jeopardy prohibits multiple punishments for the same
offense. See, e.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632 (1915); Ebling v. Morgan, 237 U.S.
625 (1915); Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy,
supra note 17, at 266 n.13; Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy
Clauses: New Life For a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 339-40
n.4. But see 67 YALE L.J. 916, 919-20 n.17 (1958).
The Supreme Court addressed this issue most recently in North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969). In Pearce the Court held that when a defendant has served part
of a sentence imposed under a conviction which is later reversed, the punishment already
exacted must be credited in imposing sentence for the same offense after retrial because
"the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the same of-
fense." id. at 717.
25. This protection corresponds to the common law plea of autrefois convict. See
Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 341-42 n.13; Comment, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 262 n.1.
26. This test was originally formulated in The King v. Vandercomb & Abbott, 2
Leach 708, 720, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 461 (Ex. 1796):
[Ulnless the first indictment were such as the prisoner might have been con-
victed upon by proof of the facts contained in the second indictment, an ac-
quittal on the first indictment can be no bar to the second.
It entered the American courts in somewhat altered form through the decision in Morey
v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. (12 Browne) 433, 434 (1871):
A conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a subsequent con-
viction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence required to support a
conviction upon one of them would have been sufficient to warrant a convic-
tion upon the other.
Thus, the "same evidence" test refers to the evidence required by the statute for convic-
tion, not the evidence actually presented at trial. This test also bars a later prosecution
if the evidence required to convict for either crime is sufficient to convict on the other.
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to determine whether the double jeopardy clause applies. Under this
test two offenses are not the "same offense" if each requires proof of
a fact that the other does not17 Since each statutory provision usually
requires proof of some separate facts, the "same evidence" test often
exposes the defendant to separate trials28 and multiple punishments
2
for a single criminal action.
In the context of multiple trials,30 the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
incorporated into the double jeopardy clause by the Supreme Court's
decision in Ashe v. Swenson,3' extends the protection of that clause
beyond the narrow confines of the "same evidence" test. 2  When an
Unlike the English rule, the American "same evidence" test thus bars prosecution of a
lesser included offense after prosecution of the greater offense. The formula usually em-
ployed in the federal courts was announced in Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338,
342 (1911), quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, supra at 443:
A single act may be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute requires
proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and pun-
ishment under the other.
Courts use this test both in new prosecutions, following a conviction or acquittal (as in
Gavieres), and in single trials at which multiple charges are brought. See Blockburger
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); notes 35-37 infra and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the history and development of the same evidence test and the prob-
lems associated with offense defining tests, see J. SIGLER, supra note 18, at 38-117, 155-
87; Kirchheimer, supra note 19, at 527-34; Note, supra note 19, at 741-46; Comment,
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 269-83.
27. See note 26 supra. For variations of the same evidence test, see Lugar, Crimi-
nal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REV. 317, 321-29 (1954); Note,
Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7 BROOKLYN L. Rnv. 79, 83-
86 (1937); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 262-74; 56 YALE L.J. 132,
134 (1947).
28. See cases cited note 20 supra.
29. See cases cited note 21 supra.
30. In this context the policy underlying the double jeopardy clause is that
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby sub-
jecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live
in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possi-
bility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
31. 397 U.S. 436 (1970), noted in 71 COLUM. L. Rav. 321 (1971).
32. Collateral estoppel means "that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between
the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
The doctrine has long been available to criminal defendants in federal courts. In United
States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916), the Supreme Court held that res judicata
could bar a second prosecution for the same offense even when double jeopardy did not
apply. In that case, an indictment was dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
A later case involving different parties established that this dismissal was erroneous.
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issue has been determined in favor of the defendant in a previous trial,
collateral estoppel prevents the government from relitigating that
Defendant was again indicted for the same offense, and the trial court dismissed once
more; although defendant had not been placed in jeopardy in the first prosecution and,
therefore, could not invoke the double jeopardy clause, the prior judgment was res judi-
cata on the statute of limitations issue. In affirming this decision, Justice Holmes spoke
for a unanimous Court:
The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has
tended to give the impression that when it did not apply in terms, there was
no other principle that could. But the Fifth Amendment was not intended to
do away with what in the civil law is a fundamental principle of justice...
in order, when a man has once been acquitted on the merits, to enable the gov-
ernment to prosecute him a second time.
Id. at 88. In Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948), the Court held that in
a subsequent prosecution for a different offense, the doctrine would apply to "conclude
those matters in issue which the verdict determined .... Id. at 578. Although the
Court termed this doctrine "res judicata," the prohibition against relitigating issues at
a second trial in which a different offense is charged is actually collateral estoppel. See
71 COLUM. L. REv. 321, 327 n.43 (1971).
The scope of the protection afforded by collateral estoppel has increased as the pro-
liferation of overlapping and related statutory offenses has continued to diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the traditional double jeopardy doctrine and res judicata, both of which
apply only in the case of a reprosecution for the same offense. See 1B J. MooRE, FEM-
ERAL PRACTICE I 0.418[2], at 2766 (1974). One court has noted that collateral estoppel
has "peculiar applicability. . . to successive actions 'growing out of the same transaction'
. . ." (i.e., multiple trials at which a defendant is charged with offenses involving es-
sentially similar, but not "the same" facts under the same evidence test). United States
v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1961). See Lugar, supra note 27; Mayers and
Yarbrough, supra note 18; Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17; 71 COLuM. L.
REv. 321 (1971).
Since collateral estoppel precludes relitigation only of those issues actually determined
by a prior judgment, courts have experienced great difficulty applying the doctrine to
criminal cases in which judgments are based on general verdicts of guilty or not guilty
rather than on specific findings of fact. See Lugar, supra note 27, at 333-34; Mayers
and Yarbrough, supra note 18, at 33-39; Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17,
at 283-86; 71 CLUM. L. REv. 321 (1971). Some courts refused to apply the doctrine
in the face of the inevitable uncertainty about which issues had been determined in the
prior litigation. In State v. Hoag, 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956), a!l'd, 356 U.S.
464 (1958), the defendant, charged with robbing three individuals, offered an alibi de-
fense, and was acquitted. He was then tried and convicted of robbing two other victims
of the same crime. The Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the contention that the
defendant had established an alibi defense by the first trial, reasoning that although de-
fendant never contested the occurrence of the robbery "the trial of the first three indict-
ments involved several questions, not just the defendant's identity, and there is no way of
knowing upon which question the jury's verdict turned." Id. at 505, 122 A.2d at 632.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held that the defendant had not been
denied due process. The majority reasoned that even if the Constitution required courts
to apply collateral estoppel, the New Jersey court had done so. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 446, 471 (1958).
The Supreme Court subsequently condemned this judicial myopia, and insisted that
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issue.38  If the issue is essential to conviction in the later trial, the
second prosecution is barred.34
The second problem-multiple punishment for a single course of
criminal conduct-often arises at a single trial.8  In this context the
double jeopardy clause does not afford a defendant adequate protec-
tion. 8 Collateral estoppel cannot apply, and use of the "same evidence"
test would often result in a multiplication of penalties for the defendant's
courts examine the record of the prior prosecution to determine the issue upon which
a rational jury must have based its verdict. In Ashe v. Swenson, supra, the Court
reasoned:
"If a later court is permitted to state that the jury may have disbelieved substan-
tial and uncontradicted evidence of the prosecution on a point the defendant
did not contest, the possibile multiplicity of prosecutions is staggering .... In
fact, such a restrictive definition of 'determined' amounts simply to a rejection
of collateral estoppel, since it is impossible to imagine a statutory offense in
which the government has to prove only one element or issue to sustain a con-
viction."
397 U.S. at 444 n.9, quoting Mayers and Yarbrough, supra note 18, at 8. Ashe,
like Hoag, involved a defendant who was tried for robbing some of the victims of a
single crime. He relied on an alibi defense, was acquitted, and then was tried again
for robbing another victim of the same crime. The Court reviewed the evidence, the
alibi defense, and the jury instructions and decided that "[tihe single rationally con-
ceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether the petitioner had been one of the
robbers." Id. at 445. Since the jury accepted the alibi, collateral estoppel barred the
state from trying him again for that robbery. The Court in Ashe instructed lower courts
to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel liberally and realistically, to assume that ju-
ries act rationally, and to adhere to the following guidelines when attempting to ascer-
tain which issues were determined by a judgment based upon a general verdict:
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was based upon a general verdict, as
is usually the case, this approach requires a court to "examine the record of
a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and
other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have
grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks
to foreclose from consideration."
Id. at 444, quoting Mayers and Yarbrough, supra note 18, at 38-39. For discussion of
the constitutional dimensions of collateral estoppel, see lB J. MooRE, supra f 0.418[2];
Lugar, supra note 27; Mayers and Yarbrough, supra note 18; Note, Constitutional Col-
lateral Estoppel: A Bar to Relitigation of Federal Habeas Decisions, 80 YALE LJ. 1229
(1971); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 203 (1966).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961); United States
v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466 (3d Cir. 1943).
34. See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972); Harris v. Washington, 404
U.S. 55 (1971); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Sealfon v. United States, 332
U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Kramer, 289 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1961).
35. See cases cited note 21 supra.
36. Courts respond to a plea of double jeopardy in this circumstance by applying
the "same evidence" test, just as in the multiple trial situation. See notes 24 & 26
supra. Application of the "same evidence" test almost invariably results in a finding
of separate offenses. See cases cited note 21 supra.
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single criminal act.37  The courts, however, have modified by statutory
construction the harshness of the "same evidence" test. The Supreme
Court has formulated a rule of lenity8 which prohibits multiple punish-
ment by strictly interpreting ambiguous statutory language dividing a
single course of conduct into several offenses. 9
37. See cases cited note 21 supra. The policy underlying the protection against mul-
tiple punishment is "to insure that the defendant's punishment will be commensurate
with, but not greater than, his criminal liability." Note, supra note 19, at 736-37 (foot-
note omitted). This protection has a constitutional dimension because although the dou-
ble jeopardy clause does not limit congressional power to make "each stick in a faggot
a single criminal unit," it does prohibit the judiciary from imposing multiple punishment
when Congress has not provided for it. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
See Note, supra note 19, at 737; Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 302-
15; Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a
Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, supra note 17, at 340, 363-64.
38. Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955).
39. As Chief Justice Warren observed in dissent in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S.
386, 393 (1958), the problem of multiple punishment arises in two contexts: (1) de-
fendant's single act or continuing course of conduct violates a single statutory prohibi-
tion more than once; and (2) defendant's act or course of conduct is prohibited by more
than one statutory provision. The Court has employed a presumption against the pro-
priety of multiple punishment to modify the harshness of the "same evidence" test in both
situations. In the case of In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887), the Court construed a stat-
ute prohibiting cohabitation with more than one woman to create a "continuous offense."
It was therefore held improper for the lower court to have imposed three consecutive
sentences stemming from convictions which each charged cohabitation with the same
seven women in a different year. In United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,
344 U.S. 218 (1952), the Court held that a thirty-two count information charging an
employer with separate offenses for violation of the minimum wage, overtime, and re-
cordkeeping sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to each of his employ-
ees was properly reduced to a three-count information charging one violation of each
section. The Court anticipated the language that three years later appeared as the rule
of lenity:
[Wihen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Con-
gress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alterna-
tive, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and
definite. We should not derive outlawry from some ambiguous implication.
Id. at 221-22. In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955), the Court held that a single
transportation of more than one woman across state lines for immoral purposes did not
constitute more than one offense under the Mann Act. Although the Court conceded
that Congress could provide for cumulative punishment for the transportation of each
woman,
[w]hen Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an
undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. . . .[1f
Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without
ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into
multiple offenses ....
Id. at 83-84. The Court applied this rule in Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169
(1958), holding that a single gunshot constituted only a single violation of a statute pro-
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The Supreme Court has applied the rule of lenity to avert multiple
punishment under the Federal Bank Robbery Act. 0 In Prince v.
United States,41 the Court concluded that Congress added the unlawful
entry provision of the Act to criminalize conduct falling short of
robbery. When a robbery is consummated, the unlawful entry "merges
into the completed crime . . .".42 Courts could not, therefore, im-
pose consecutive sentences for bank robbery and for entering a bank
with intent to commit robbery. In Heflin v. United States,4 13 the Court
determined that Congress passed the receiving provision not to "pyra-
mid penalties" on bank robbers but "to provide punishment for those
hibiting assault on a federal officer even though the shot wounded more than one officer.
The rule has also been applied to hold that a single interstate transportation of five forged
money orders constituted a single punishable offense. Castle v. United States, 368 U.S.
13 (per curiam), vacating 287 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1961). For illustrations of the use
of the rule of lenity to prohibit multiple punishment when a criminal transaction violates
a number of overlapping statutory provisions, see United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544
(1976); Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358
U.S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957). See notes 41-49 infra
and accompanying text.
The rule of lenity is analogous to the maxim that criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed. The former requires that doubt whether the legislature intended multiple
punishments to be imposed for a single course of conduct be resolved in favor of the
defendant; the latter mandates that doubt whether the legislature intended to prohibit
a course of conduct at all must be resolved in favor of the defendant. The similarity
is illustrated by Chief Justice Marshall's explanation of the basis of the maxim:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much
less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law
for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of pun-
ishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punish-
ment.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) (emphasis added). One
commentator explains the relationship between lenity and strict construction as follows:
The rule of lenity is a penological analog to the rule of strict construction.
Together they require that liberty be forfeited only if the legislature has clearly
indicated that it should be, and only to the extent that it has plainly authorized.
Both rules dictate that the punitive powers of the state may be invoked only
pursuant to a definite, general and prospective prohibition, not at the arbitrary
behest of public officials. Punishing convicted men is no less serious business
than deciding whether they can be punished.
Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 17, at 316. The same author maintains that
the rule of lenity is a "constitutionally compelled canon of construction." Id. at 316-
17. For suggested rules of statutory construction for determining the propriety of multi-
ple punishment absent clear legislative intent, see Kirchheimer, supra note 19.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1970), quoted in notes 1 & 4 supra.
41. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
42. Id. at 328.
43. 358 U.S. 415 (1959).
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who receive the loot from the robbers" and "to reach a new group of
wrongdoers."" The Court barred consecutive sentences for bank
robbery and for receiving property stolen in that robbery.45  Construing
a similar statute," the Court in Milanovich v. United States,47 found
the same legislative intent and held that when the evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction for either larceny or receiving, the jury must
be instructed that it can return a guilty verdict on either charge but not
on both."8 Finally, in United States v. Gaddis,49 the Court extended
44. ld. at 419-20.
45. Id. In Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941), and Green v. United States,
365 U.S. 301 (1961), the Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), quoted in note 1 supra,
does, not create a separate offense but rather makes bank robbery an aggravated offense.
Accordingly. two sentences may not be imposed on a defendant convicted under §§
2113 (a) and (d). The Government did not contest either case. O'Clair v. United States,
470 F.2d 1199 (1st Cir. 1972), applied the rule of lenity in holding that separate convic-
tins under each section are improper even if only one sentence is imposed. The jury
should be instructed to consider the aggravated charge first. Id. at 1204.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970), which provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the
tse of another, or without authority, sells conveys or disposes of any record,
\oucher, money, or thing of value of the United States. . . or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to convert it to
his own use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or
converted-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both ....
47. 365 U.S. 551 (1961). Defendant planned a robbery with three accomplices and
droc them to its site-a naval base. Defendant waited in her car while the others
broke into a safe on the base and hid the loot in a nearby woods. Approximately two
weeks later she acquired some of the loot. Defendant was convicted of larceny and of
receiking and concealing currency stolen in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970). She
was given a ten-year sentence on the larceny count and a five-year concurrent sentence
on the receiving count. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, relying on Heflin,
set, notes 43-45 supra, ordered the concurrent five-year sentence stricken, reasoning that
Congress did not intend to permit the government to convict and punish a defendant for
both stealing and receiving under this statute. Milanovich v. United States, 275 F.2d 716
(4th Cir. 1960). The Supreme Court ruled that vacating defendant's sentence for re-
ceising stolen property did not cure the trial court's error in failing to instruct the jury
that the defendant could not be convicted on both counts. The Court reversed both
cons ictions, remanded for a new trial, and ordered the trial court to give the jury the
proper instruction. See text accompanying note 48 infra. The current vitality of
Milanovich's requirement of a new trial is suspect. See United States v. Gaddis, 424
U.S. 544. 551 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
48. 365 U.S. at 554-55. It is well established at common law that a person
who actually steals property cannot be convicted of receiving the stolen property.
The rationule for the rule is that it is factually impossible to receive goods from
oneself. See, e.g., Bargesser v. State, 95 Fla. 404, 116 So. 12 (1928); People v. Ensor,
310 Ill. 483, 142 N.E. 175 (1923); Robin v. People, 104 Ill. 565 (1882); Commonwealth
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the "pyramiding of penalties" rationale to prohibit conviction for both
bank robbery and possessing the proceeds of that robbery. 0
In the view of three judges in Phillips v. United States,51 "[tihe single
rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury""2 in the first trial
was the defendant's presence in the bank at the time of the robbery.
The jury's verdict established that he was not; therefore, collateral
estoppel precluded introduction of evidence at defendant's second trial
that he had been present." Since the collateral estoppel issue in
Phillips turned mainly on the reading of the record of the first trial,"
the only real legal issue in this case was the applicability of Milanovich.
v. Haskins, 128 Mass. 60 (1880); State v. Hamilton, 172 S.C. 453, 174 S.E. 396 (1934)
(defendant entitled to a jury instruction that he could not be convicted of both larceny
and receiving the stolen goods). Since the rule is based on a factual impossibility and not
the desire to prevent the multiple punishment of thieves, it prohibits conviction of a de-
fendant whom the evidence shows actually stole the goods even if receiving is the only
crime with which he is or could be charged. It applies whether or not the defendant
can be, or has been, convicted of theft. See, e.g., Gallman v. State, 29 Ala. App. 264,
195 So. 768 (1940); People v. Ensor, supra; State v. Honig, 78 Mo. 249 (1883). The
rationale for the rule does not apply, however, when the charge is possession rather than
receiving. It is not factually impossible for a thief to possess property which he has
stolen. See Carroll v. Sanford, 167 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1948) (upholding consecutive sen-
tence for theft of goods from interstate shipment and possession of same); Bloch v.
United States, 261 F. 321 (5th Cir. 1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 484 (1920). See
generally Annot., 136 A.L.R. 1087 (1942).
The mutually-exclusive-offense doctrine, however, is based on statutory construction,
not on the factual impossibility which underlies the common law rule. See Milanovich
v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 554 (1961); 47 IowA L. REv. 740 (1962). The Su-
preme Court has hinted strongly that whether or not a defendant charged with reception
or possession under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) as the actual thief is irrelevant to the propriety
of his conviction under that section. See United States v. Gaddis, 424 U.S. 544, 550 n.15
(1976). The mutually-exclusive-offense rule only prohibits his conviction under both
that section and § 2113(a), (b), or (d). id.
49. 424 U.S. 544 (1976).
50. See note 4 supra.
51. 518 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1975).
52. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 (1970).
53. 518 F.2d at 110.
54. The four judges who rejected defendant's collateral estoppel argument presented
no justification for their conclusion in the en bane decision. The court said that "on the
facts as recited in the panel opinion the jury's implicit acquittal of bank robbery in the
first trial did not collaterally estop the government. . . ." Id. at 109-10, citing Phillips
v. United States, 502 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1974) (Craven, J., dissenting). Judge
Craven argued that since the jury at Phillips' first trial did not specifically find him not
guilty of bank robbery, they could have reached their verdict without ever agreeing on
whether Phillips was in the bank. He conceded that the double jeopardy clause pro-
tected against retrial on the robbery charge. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184
(1957) (reversing a first degree murder conviction after an earlier guilty verdict on the
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Three judges extended the Milanovich analysis to exclude the evi-
dence. They reasoned that in prohibiting the possession of money
stolen from a bank, Congress intended to reach a new group of wrong-
doers-a group restricted to those who could not be reached by the
bank robbery provisions of the Act. Therefore, one proven guilty of
bank robbery cannot be convicted of possessing the proceeds of that
robbery. Evidence of defendant's presence in the bank during the
robbery would tend to prove that he had participated in the robbery.
"[A]s a practical matter," such evidence was inadmissible at his trial as
a possessor because allowing a jury to convict him of possession while
believing him guilty of robbery would "implicitly violate" the Milano-
vich rule. 5
lesser included offense of second degree murder had been set aside on appeal). Al-
though conceding that double jeopardy requires only exposure to conviction and not an
actual verdict, Judge Craven argued that collateral estoppel requires an actual verdict
since it "is premised on a factual determination in favor of the accused." 502 F.2d at
233.
By denying Phillips the benefit of collateral estoppel because he was only "implicitly"
acquitted on the bank robbery charge, the court came close to adopting the "hypertechni-
cal and archaic approach" condemned in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)
(see notes 31-32 supra). The facts in Phillips (see note 2 supra) and the jury's refusal
to convict defendant of robbery clearly show that it considered the issue of his presence
in the bank and resolved it in his favor. A verdict of acquittal is not a precondition
to applying collateral estoppel. The form of judgment is a factor that should be con-
sidered along with the evidence, the charges, jury instructions, and other matters in the
record; it should not be conclusive. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85
(1916); Mulreed v. Kropp, 425 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir. 1970) (collateral estoppel applied
to determination made in entering judgment on guilty plea when state law required trial
court to determine factual basis of plea before accepting it); United States v. Armco
Steel Corp., 252 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Cal. 1966) (when delays attributable to insufficient
evidence to go to trial, dismissal of case for unnecessary delay by prosecutor equivalent
to a judgment of acquittal; collateral estoppel thus bars later trial).
Judge Craven's second argument against applying collateral estoppel in this case was
that the retrial would be on the lesser charge. He conceives of collateral estoppel as a
device to prevent "prosecutorial abuses" and "harassing the defendant by repeatedly
calling him to answer the same proof." 502 F.2d at 234. This position conflicts, how-
ever, with the Supreme Court's rule in Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971). In
Harris the defendant was tried and acquitted for the murder of one victim of a bombing.
The Court held that a subsequent trial of the defendant for the murder and assault of
other victims of the bombing was barred by collateral estoppel even though expert testi-
mony establishing the identity of the defendants was excluded at the first trial for rea-
sons that would not apply at the second. The Court reasoned that since the issue of
defendant's identity as the bomber was resolved in his favor at the first trial, "the consti-
tutional guarantee applies irrespective of whether the jury considered all relevant evi-
dence, and irrespective of the good faith of the State in bringing successive prosecu-
tions." Id. at 56-57 (emphasis added).
55. 518 F.2d at 109.
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In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Widener correctly noted that the
Supreme Court had fashioned the Milanovich rule to protect defendants
against multiple punishment. The rule has nothing to do with the
admissibility of evidence. 56
In the Milanovich line of cases,5 7 the Supreme Court applied the rule
of lenity to hold that Congress intended to establish two mutually exclu-
sive classes: those convicted of stealing and those convicted of receiv-
ing or possessing the proceeds of the robbery. The Court has never
prohibited the introduction of evidence that would allow a jury to
convict a defendant of possessing or receiving when it actually be-
lieved him guilty of stealing. In Milanovich, the Court remanded
for a new trial on both the robbery and receiving charges in the face
of evidence sufficient to support a conviction on either one."' Evi-
dence on both charges was clearly admissible even though the jury
could convict the defendant of either charge but not both." Phillips
thus bars the introduction of evidence that would have been admissible
in Milanovich.
In Phillips, the defendant had already been acquitted on the robbery
charge 0 and therefore could not suffer double conviction and punish-
ment. Applying Milanovich to this situation extends the mutually-
exclusive offense rule far beyond its rationale. 6'
In view of the weakness of the Fourth Circuit's opinion, it is unlikely
that the other circuits will follow in transforming the Milanovich
mutually-exclusive-offense doctrine into an evidentiary rule. Even
within the Fourth Circuit, the concurrence of but three of the seven
judges in this rationale diminishes its precedential force.
56. Id. at 111-12.
57. See text accompanying notes 41-50 supra.
58. 365 U.S. at 554 n.5.
59. Id. at 554-55.
60. Phillips' "implicit acquittal" entitles him to protection of the double jeopardy
clause against retrial for robbery. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
61. In the absence of a question as to multiple punishment, it has never been
suggested that there is anything improper in Congress' providing alternative
statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and
the same interest.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 380 & nn.28-29 (1968) citing Milanovich, Hellin,
and Prince.
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